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A central issue in public utility regulation is the choice of an ap-
propriate cost standard for the setting of rates in a competitive en-
vironment. In recent years, the debate within the federal regulatory
agencies, the courts, and the Congress has focused on two alternative
standards: incremental cost and fully distributed cost. This article
examines the status of these cost criteria in the pronouncements and
practices of three federal regulatory agencies. It will be argued that
these agencies have recently turned away from the use of fully dis-
tributed cost in regulating competitive rates and have come to rely
almost exclusively on measures that approximate incremental cost.
I. The Policy Choice
Incremental cost is the additional cost to the firm of supplying a
particular service. It excludes costs directly attributable to the pro-
duction of other services and certain unattributable costs which are
incurred in common for all services supplied by the firm and do
not vary with the level of output.' Fully distributed cost combines
the additional cost to the firm of supplying a particular service with
some proportion of the unattributable costs. Incremental cost or fully
distributed cost are both only pricing floors; a rate based on either
-t The authors wish to thank Dean Alfred E. Kahn of Cornell University for his careful
review of this manuscript and his many valuable suggestions.
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1. Sometimes these unattributable costs are called, with varying degrees of precision,
"overhead costs," "fixed costs," "common costs" or "remaining costs."
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would be at least equal to and often in excess of the particular cost.
Agencies have used their own terminology to describe their ap-
proximations of these cost standards. As its version of incremental
cost, the CAB has tended to use "added cost"; the ICC, on different
occasions, "out-of-pocket cost" or "variable cost."'2 Fully distributed
cost is referred to as "fully allocated cost" or simply "cost."
To illustrate how these two measures are calculated, assume a firm
plans to construct a plant, and three possibilities are under considera-
tion: (1) a plant that could produce A alone for $7 million; (2) a
plant that could produce B alone for $8 million; and (3) a plant that
could produce A and B at a total cost of $12 million. Comparing
plant (3) with plant (1) tells us that the incremental cost of producing
B in addition to A is $5 million; by comparing plant (3) with plant
(2), we see that the incremental cost of producing A in addition to B
is $4 million. Because the two incremental cost figures total only $9
million instead of the $12 million cost of turning out the two products
together as in plant (3), the incremental cost figures leave $3 million
which is not directly attributable to either service. A fully distributed
cost calculation would allocate the $3 million of unattributable costs
between A and B. The $3 million could be allocated on the basis of
any of a variety of accounting conventions. For example, it could be
allocated in proportion to the incremental costs of A and B, making
the fully distributed cost of A approximately $5.3 million and the
fully distributed cost of B approximately $6.7 million. Another ap-
proach might be to allocate unattributable costs in proportion to the
"relative usage" of the facilities by A and B, though some convention
would then be needed to define "relative usage." In railroading, for
example, it has been calculated on the basis of the weight or volume
or value of the different classes of traffic. Whichever allocation pro-
cedure is chosen, the choice will be an arbitrary one.3
A. The Argument for Fully Distributed Cost
The advocates of fully distributed cost argue that that standard is
essential to preserve effective competition. Without it, a firm could
2. To the ICC, a rate which meets out-of-pocket costs is "compensatory." American
Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 578 (1968), the -In~ot M olds"
case; I.C.C. v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 748 (1963), the "New Haven' case.
3. See Rules to Govern the Assembling and Presenting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C.
298, 322-23 (1970); United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1347 (1964); statement of Anti-
trust Section of the American Bar Association, Hearing on S. 1457 Before the Subcomin.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
112 (1972).
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sell below "cost" those services which are threatened by competition,
covering the resulting deficits by subsidies obtained through high
charges to the customers of its monopoly services. In this way the
firm could undercut its competitors, eventually driving them out of
business. A fully distributed cost standard, on the other hand, would
require that the price of its competitive service cover some propor-
tion of the firm's unattributable costs.
B. The Argument for Incremental Cost
The advocates of an incremental cost standard argue that a rate
set on the basis of incremental cost would benefit not only the cus-
tomers of B, the firm's competitive service, but also the customers of
A, the firm's monopoly service. In an industry whose profits are limit-
ed by regulation, the production of any additional B whose incre-
mental revenue exceeds its incremental cost must benefit the cus-
tomers of A, because the net earnings of B can be used to reduce
unattributable costs otherwise borne entirely by A. Returning to our
numerical example, suppose the firm were regulated on a fully dis-
tributed cost standard and, as before, $1.7 million of the firm's
unattributable costs were allocated to B, making B's fully distributed
cost approximately $6.7 million. If potential customers of B were
willing to pay no more than $6.2 million for it, then no B would
be sold. Users of A would then shoulder the entire $3 million of
unattributable costs alone and have to be supplied by the single pur-
pose plant costing $7 million. But, if B's price were set at the com-
petitive rate of $6.2 million, well above its incremental cost floor of
$5 million, B's net earnings would reduce the $3 million of unat-
tributable costs borne by A's customers by $1.2 million. Clearly, the
customers of A are better off if B is sold at a competitive price below
its fully distributed cost floor.
Advocates of incremental cost argue that such a cost standard would
still provide a test for whether monopoly service A is subsidizing com-
petitive service B and thereby permitting the firm to sell B at a price
that undercuts its competitors. They contend that A is "subsidizing"
B only if A's customers would be better off if B were not produced.
So long as B's incremental revenue exceeds its incremental cost, how-
ever, B will be making a net contribution to reducing the firm's un-
attributable costs. Thus, if the supply of B results in a reduction in
the outlays required by A's customers, A cannot be said to be
subsidizing B.
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Finally, advocates of incremental cost argue that incremental cost
reflects the quantity of society's resources needed to supply B, while
a fully distributed cost standard protects less efficient rivals who use
up more of society's resources in supplying a product that is a sub-
stitute for B. For example, suppose Firm I can produce B at an
incremental cost of $5 million but its fully distributed cost is cal-
culated to be $6.7 million, while Firm II can produce a substitute
for B at an incremental cost of $5.8 million and a fully distributed
cost of $6.1 million. To utilize society's resources efficiently, Firm
I should supply B even though Firm II has a lower fully distributed
cost since Firm I needs only $5 million in additional resources from
society to produce B while Firm II requires $5.8 million. Yet, if
neither firm were allowed to price B below fully distributed cost,
Firm II would end up producing some or all of B.4 The fully dis-
tributed cost standard would benefit Firm II, the inefficient com-
petitor, and permit it to survive. The form of competition would
be preserved, but it would yield a price distinctly above the level which
competition would produce. An artificial price floor corresponding to
Firm II's $6.1 million fully distributed cost figure would keep the price
of B higher than that dictated by market conditions., Of course, under
this arrangement Firm I would not be able to drive Firm II out of the
market and take advantage of the monopoly that might result,0 but this
is avoided only by denying consumers the low prices which real com-
petition would produce. Fully distributed cost pricing thus offers
neither the economies of scale that could be provided by a single firm
nor the price cutting and pressure for innovation that come with true
competition.
4. In theory, one might expect Firm II to obtain all the business. But in practice the
commissions do not require utilities to price precisely at fully distributed cost (FDC). In
some cases the commissions have based a utility's rates on the fully distributed cost of
another utility so that both can remain in operation.
5. See Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, C.A.B. Order
No. 72-12-18 (1972) at 53; letter of Ralph E. Erickson, Deputy Attorney General, Hear-
ing on F. 1457 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Collm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 102-03 (1972).
6. Justice Marshall discussed this point in the Ingot Molds case but did not feel the
Court was qualified to evaluate it. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 392 U.S. at 586. There is an impressive body of literature arguing that it is hn-
probable that a profit-maximizing seller, even one with monopoly power, would or
could use below cost selling to monopolize additional markets. REPORT or Tim TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (STIGLER REPORT), 115 CoNc. REC. 15933, 15934
(1969); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L.
Rxv. 1313, 1339 (1965); Hearings on S. 1494 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 270 (1969).
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C. Who Advocates Fully Distributed Cost?
As evidence that a fully distributed cost standard protects the in-
efficient supplier and results in higher prices, advocates of the in-
cremental cost approach point to the fact that fully distributed cost
is advocated most vigorously by competitors of regulated utilities
who stand to benefit from higher utility rates. Buslines, railroads,
express companies, and airlines have argued before the CAB for a
fully distributed cost standard which would increase the rates of com-
peting airlines.7 Coal interests, unregulated gas producers, and pipe-
lines have urged the FPC to employ a fully distributed cost standard
in setting the rates for competing pipelines.8 Motor carriers and water
carriers faced with the prospect of reduced rail rates have urged the
ICC to employ such a standard." Finally, the railroads, normally op-
posed to fully distributed cost,10 have argued that the standard should
be employed in setting rates for truckers."' The Department of Justice
7. Buslines: Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, C.A.B.
Order No. 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972) at 17; Standby Youth Fares-"Young Adult" Fares,
[1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L. REP. 21,923 (CAB 1970) at 14,878; Family
Fare Tariff, [1964-1971] CCH Av. L. REP. 21,782 (CAB 1968) at 14,555; Transcontinental
Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 472 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 890 U.S. 920
(1968). Railroads: Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B.
508, 515-16, 521 (1961); Nonpriority Mail Rate Case, 34 C.A.B. 143, 165 (1961). Express
companies: Railway Express Agency v. C.A.B., 243 F.2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Airlines:
Group Inclusive Tour Basing Fares to Hawaii, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L
REP. 21,937 at 14,913-15 (CAB 1970); Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reseration Fare
Investigation, 34 CA.B. 508, 515-16 (1961).
8. Coal interests have opposed departures from the Atlantic Seaboard formula, an
FDC standard: Mississippi River Transmission Corp., 41 F.P.C. 555, 559, 567 (1969); At-
lantic Seaboard Corp., 37 F.P.C. 244, 248 (1967); Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 34
F.P.C. 973, 977-78 (1965), aJj'd sub nom. Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. F.P.C., 374 F.2d
842, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1967); United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1346 (1964); Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 28 F.P.C. 731, 733 (1962), rehearing denied, 28 F.P.C. 1033
(1962). "[T]he coal associations, were interested only in a pipeline commodity level high
enough to drive the distributors out of the utility boiler fuel market .... " Fuels Re-
search Council, Inc. v. F.P.C., 374 F.2d at 851. Unregulated gas producers (certificate
case): Pacific Gas Transmission Co., 40 F.P.C. 1147 (1968), rehearing denied, 40 F.P.C.
1504, 1506 (1968), affd sub nom. California Gas Producers Ass'n v. F.P.C., 421 F.2d 422
(9th Cir. 1970). Competing pipelines (certificate cases): Great Lakes Transmission Co., 37
F.P.C. 1070, 1090 (1967), Transwestern Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 659, 679, 681 (1965).
9. Motor carriers: Freight, All Kinds, L.C.L. Unitized Charges-U.S.A., 326 I.C.C. 594,
624, 639 (Div. 2, 1965) (Express company rates); Paint and Related Articles in Official
Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439, 444 (1959); Demountable Motortruck Bodies, Loaded or Empty,
305 I.C.C. 161, 168 (Div. 2, 1958). Water carriers: Rules to Govern the Assembling and
Presenting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 298, 357 (1970); Plastics from Texas to the East,
314 I.C.C. 347, 352 (Div. 2, 1961).
10. Rules to Govern the Assembling and Presenting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 293,
341-42, 398 (1970); Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 55 (1960), order
set aside sub nom. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn.
1961), vacated and remanded sub nom. I.C.C. v. N.Y., N.H. & H. RtL, 372 U.S. 744 (1963);
see also Canned or Preserved Foodstuffs, Fla. to N.Y. and N.J., 326 I.C.C. 776, 784 (Div.
2, 1966).
11. Animal Feed-Kansas City, Mo. to Chicago, 325 I.C.C. 147, 151 (1965). Similarly,
airlines which normally justify their own promotional rates on an added cost formula,
have argued for FDC in opposing the promotional rates of other air carriers. Group
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has sometimes favored a fully distributed cost criterion, but has more
frequently opposed it.12 Occasionally, industrial consumers have ad-
vocated fully distributed cost when proposed rate reductions would
help their competitors,1 3 or when fully distributed costing, by some
quirk, would produce lower rates for them alone.14 But the evidence
is clear: Competitors who face increased price competition from rate
reductions have been the prime advocates of fully distributed cost
methods of price regulation.
II. The Standards Applied by Regulatory Agencies
The battlefield between these two standards has been the regula-
tory agencies. In the decade following World War II, the CAB, FPC,
and ICC utilized fully distributed cost in some form. During the
past decade, however, the winds have shifted toward an incremental
cost standard.
A. The Application of Fully Distributed Cost
Although the CAB recognized early that a rigid fully distributed
cost standard could stultify the growth of the airline industry,"6 it never-
Inclusive Tour Basing Fares to Hawaii, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L. REr.
$ 21,937 at 14,914-15 (CAB 1970); Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Investi.
gation, 34 C.A.B. 508, 515-16 (1961). Truckers who favor an FDC criterion for railroads
have argued that their own minimum rates should be based on a variable cost standard.
Rules to Govern the Assembling and Presenting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 298, 347
(1970).
12. The Justice Department opposed FDC in the Ingot Molds case. Brief for the
United States at 8, 14-17, American Lines v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 392 U.S. 571
(1968). It took a pro-FDC approach in an FCC proceeding. Reply Comments of the U.S.
Department of Justice (Dec. 29, 1970) at 29, Specialized Common Carrier Services, 33
F.C.C. 2d 408 (1972). At oral argument, in that proceeding, the Department's enthusiasm
for FDC had diminished to a "slight preference." Tr. 247 (Jan. 22, 1971). The Justice
Department has carried its ambivalence to the ultimate conclusion. It has opposed an
FDC criterion in a federal selling below cost statute as producing higher consumer prices,
undesirable price rigidity and inefficient resource allocation. Hearing on S. 1457 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. at 102-03 (1972).
13. E.g., Corn and Soybeans, Midwest to Gulf Ports, for Export, 339 I.C.C. 595, 610
(1971); Corn and Soybeans, Midwest to Pacific Northwest Ports, 339 I.C.C. 465, 479 (Dlv.
2, 1971); Portland Freight Traffic Ass'n v. Northern Pacific Ry., 337 I.C.C. 826, 827
(Div. 2, 1970); Wine, Pacific Coast to East, 326 I.C.C. 119, 120, 134-35, 144 (Div. 2, 1965);
aff'd, 329 I.C.C. 167, 169 (1966).
14. Florida Gas Transmission Co., CCH UTIL. L. REP. $ 11,276 (FPC 1972), El Paso
Natural Gas Co., CCH UTIL. L. REP. 11,232 (FPC 1971), modified 11,302 (FPC 1972);
United Fuel Gas Corp. et al., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1346 (1964).
15. A fully allocated cost standard
would probably unjustifiably restrict the development of freight volume and un-
warrentably deny the public as well as the existing types of traffic the benefits In
reduced unit costs which such volume increases would bring.
Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 346 (1948). See also Domestic Passenger.
Fare Investigation, Phase 7-Fare Level, C.A.B. Order No. 71-4-59, 71-4-60 (April 9, 1971)
at 45-46.
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theless fixed rates at "attainable" full cost levels. The Board took a
protectionist view of its responsibilities and on occasion propped up
rates above the incremental costs of certain airlines in order to protect
their competitors. In 1948, in the Air Freight Rate Investigation,1 6
the Board prescribed minimum freight rates for the industry which
were based on the "full costs" of the noncertified carriers. Eastern
Airlines objected because the record did not show that its freight
operations were conducted at a loss, but the Board nevertheless said
"the controlling fact is that a large proportion of the freight rates
for the industry as a whole was below cost."'17 Even though costs and
average yields may vary from carrier to carrier, "in a competitive
industry composed of a group of carriers performing the same class
of service, the rates charged by all carriers for such service must be
substantially the same." In the Board's view, uniform rates that ex-
ceeded a carrier's cost were apparently appropriate for "the mainte-
nance of competitive balance, the development of air freight on a
sound economic basis and the need to avoid discriminatory rates .... .,18
Similarly, the FPC utilized a fully distributed cost standard in set-
ting pipeline rates. In 1952, in the Atlantic Seaboard case, the Com-
mission allocated fifty percent of the pipeline fixed cost to the "de-
mand charge," a rate paid exclusively by the pipeline peak customers,
and the other fifty percent to the "commodity charge," a rate paid by
both peak and off-peak (interruptible) customers.1" Since pipelines and
their distributor customers base their charge for interruptible gas on
the commodity charge, Atlantic Seaboard costing produced high in-
terruptible rates and made it difficult for pipelines to compete with
other energy sources for large industrial customers.
20
The Atlantic Seaboard formula was not expressly designed to dis-
courage competition among the pipelines. Nevertheless, protectionism
16. 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
17. 9 C.A.B. at .58 n.3.
18. 9 C.A.B. at 350.
19. Atlantic Seaboard Corp. et al., 11 F.P.C. 43, 52-57 (1952). Gas is often sold under
a two-part tariff composed of a "demand charge" and a "commodity charge." The
demand charge is supposed to reflect the cost of the capacity built into the pipeline
to accommodate peak requirements for firm customers, while the commodity charge is
the payment for the volume of gas consumed. Distributors generally use the pipeline
commodity charge as the basis for their rates to "interruptible customers," typically
large industrial customers who use gas for boiler fuel. If the pipeline is permitted to
establish a relatively low commodity charge, interruptive gas rates can be lower and
other fuels such as coal and oil may find it more difficult to compete.
20. The FPC agrees that the Atlantic Seaboard formula has "serious infirmities,"
makes an "artificial assignment" of fixed cost, "rarely reflects with accuracy utilization
of the system by the various classes of service," that "it is generally necessary to adjust
Seaboard rates to get workable results," and that these adjustments have ranged as high
as one hundred percent. United Fuel Gas Corp. et al., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1347 (1964).
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has entered the Commission's thinking and it has on occasion per-
mitted pipelines to require customers who obtained new sources of
supply for part of their requirements to continue to contribute toward
the common cost of their formerly exclusive supplier.21 The purpose
was, according to the D.C. Circuit, "to restrain the customer from
shifting its purchase from its historic supplier to a certified second
supplier to the full extent otherwise dictated by the relative costs of
gas" 22
For years the ICC assumed the role of a "giant handicapper" 23 which
achieved a division of the market by adjusting the prices of com-
peting modes of transportation, typically requiring rail rates to be
above water rates to assure that water carriers obtained a "propor-
tionate share" of the market.24 In Senate hearings questioning the
propriety of such a policy, ICC Chairman Freas summed up the Com-
mission's position in favor of fully distributed cost (using "full cost"
for fully distributed cost and "out-of-pocket cost" for incremental
cost):
Whenever conditions permit, given transportation should re-
turn the full cost of performing carrier service. . . . In many in-
stances, however, the full cost of the low-cost form of transporta-
tion exceeds the out-of-pocket cost of another. If, then, we are
required to accept the rates of the high-cost carrier merely be-
cause they exceed its out-of-pocket costs, we see no way of pre-
serving the inherent advantage of the low cost carriers.
235
21. Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 28 F.P.C. 860 (1962), order set aside and remanded sub
nom. Lynchburg Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 336 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
22. Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. F.P.C., 404 F.2d 1268, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
23. Senator Smathers coined the phrase "giant handicapper." Hearings on S. 3778
Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 45,
178 (1958).
24. Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 286 I.C.C. 5, 33 (1952); Rail & Barge Joint Rates,
270 I.C.C. 591, 610 (1948), modified, 274 I.C.C. 229 (1949), a 'd, Alabama G.R. Co. v.
United States, 88 F. Supp. 982, 987 (N.D. 111. 1950), affd, 340 U.S. 216, 223 (1951). This
policy contributed to the decline of the railroads' market share, and the railroads car-
ried their case to Congress. The railroads' efforts culminated in 1958. They sought
legislation which would preclude the ICC, in fixing minimum rates, from considering
the impact of those rates on the traffic of other transportation modes, the relative
charges for those other modes, and whether the proposed charges were lower than neccs-
sary to meet competition. The legislation which emerged retained the National Trans.
portation Policy requirement that the ICC should regulate all modes of regulated
transportation so as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each. But It
added a new provision to the effect that "[r]ates of a carrier shall not be held up to
a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation." This state.
ment seems clear enough, despite the qualification, "giving due consideration to the
objectives of the national transportation policy." Interstate Commerce Act, § 15a(3), 49
U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1970).
25. Hearings on S. 3778 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1958).
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Commissioner Freas' testimony was elevated to prominence in 1963
in the New Haven case.20 There the ICC required that rail rates
be held six percent above competing water-truck rates to assure the
continued operation of the coastal water carriers. The Supreme Court
set aside the Commission's findings, holding that the ICC had no
right to impose high rates on the railroads unless it was to protect
an "inherent advantage" of the water carriers such as the kind de-
scribed by Commissioner Freas. Since the Commission had made no
findings of "inherent cost advantage," it could not require a rail
rate differential.
The New Haven case left the ICC to decide upon the criterion it
would use to determine "inherent cost advantage" whether by fully
distributed cost, incremental cost, or some other cost datum. The is-
sue was temporarily resolved in the Ingot Molds case,27 where the Su-
preme Court sustained the Commission's use of fully distributed cost
in disallowing reduced rail rates, though the Commission indicated
that it had not given the matter sufficient consideration but rather
would do so in pending rule-making.28
B. The Application of Incremental Cost
In recent years the three regulatory agencies have steered away from
a fully distributed cost standard and closer toward one based on in-
cremental cost. In doing so they have cited enabling legislation which
requires them to ensure that service is supplied at the "lowest rea-
sonable rate"; they have increasingly come to adopt economic argu-
ments that incremental pricing benefits all consumers of the service,
while fully distributed pricing may make it impossible for the
service to compete with other suppliers.
1. The Civil Aeronautics Board
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires the CAB to consider
in rate-making "[t]he need in the public interest of adequate and
efficient transportation . . . at the lowest cost consistent with the
furnishing of such service";20 to encourage and develop an air trans-
26. I.C.C. v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 755 (1963).
27. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77 (1965), rev'd sub nora. Louisville
& N. R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1967). reu'd and remanded sub
nom. American Commercial Lines v. Louisville & N. R.RL, 392 U.S. 571 (1968).
28. 392 U.S. at 591.
29. Federal Aviation Act, § 1002(e)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e)(2) (1970); Domestic Pas-
senger-Fare Investigation Phase 6A-Seating Configurations, 2 CCH Av. L. REP. 22,073
at 14,147 (CAB 1972).
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portation system with "adequate, economical, and efficient service";
and "to promote, encourage, and develop civil aeronautics."30 Thus
the Board can be expected to look favorably on "discount" services
which increase the use of air transportation, improve load factors, and
offer customers more service options and lower rates.
Moreover, it has been held that under the Act the Board need be
concerned only with the air transportation industry and need not
consider the effect of airline rates on competing surface or water
carriers.31 Surface carriers may attack airline rates only on the basis
of the traveling public's interest in reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory rates, not in terms of their interest as competitors.3 2 Moreover,
the CAB has also extended this policy of not protecting competitors
to those within the airline industry. Competing airline carriers, the
Board has held, are "in no way entitled to the preservation of a
particular share of the market."83
In the late 50's and early 60's, the CAB turned away from the con-
tention that "a fare should be high enough to pay its own way eventu-
ally on a fully allocated cost basis."34 Instead, it required any "dis-
count" or promotional service designed to fill lightly loaded aircraft,
such as youth standby, military, or family plan transportation, to meet
two criteria. First, the plan must have a beneficial "profit-impact" on
the carrier; that is, its revenues must more than cover the costs added
by the traffic, taking into account possible diversions from other airline
services. Second, the discount must not have an adverse effect on com-
peting carriers sufficiently serious to make the fares unreasonable05
This second requirement, while intended to limit the vigor of price
competition, did not rest on a fully distributed cost standard. The
Board also held that the burden of proof of such adverse effect was
on the complaining carriers.30 Because high standards of proof were
required, competing carriers simply avoided raising the issue. Thus,
30. Federal Aviation Act, § 102(a), (c), (f), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a), (c), (f) (1970).
31. Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 4 4 (5th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Rates for Transportation by Air of Non Priority Mail,
30 C.A.B. 951, 953 (1960) (employees of rail industries).
32. Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., supra note 31, at 476; Flying Tiger
Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 350 F.2d 462, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
33. Group Inclusive Tour Basing Fares to Hawaii, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder) CCH
Av. L. REP. 21,937 at 14,915 (CAB 1970). This is a very different approach from the
Board's opinion in Airfreight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
34. Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508, 514
(1961).
35. Three cases in which this twin standard was employed are: Frontier Excursion
Fares Case, 42 C.A.B. 440 (1965); Delta Off-Peak Coach Fares, 39 C.A.B. 377 (1963);
Capital Family-Plan Case, 26 C.A.B. 8 (1957).
36. Capital Family-Plan Case, 26 C.A.B. 8, 12 (1957).
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the profit-impact criterion, taking as its cost standard the "added cost"
of the service, became the only effective standard for discount rates.37
The profit-impact test assumed that discount fares were applied
solely to "fill up" unused space, and that equipment was not designed
or purchased nor were flights scheduled merely to meet the needs of
the discount service. But by 1969 the CAB observed that discount
fares amounted to some forty percent of passenger traffic, thereby cast-
ing doubt on the assumption that they required no additional equip-
ment or scheduling.38
In January 1970, the Board commenced the Domestic Passenger-
Fare Investigation.3" In its recent Phase 540 decision, it reaffirmed its
adherence to the profit-impact test but added two new wrinkles to its
discount costing standard. Starting from the proposition that in the
"long term" all costs are variable but in the "short term" most costs
are fixed since an airline cannot immediately expand its fleet or add
to its schedules, the Board concluded that the profit-impact test could
measure only short-term benefits. That is, while in the short term
discount fares may indeed fill empty seats and profit the airlines, in
the long term the carriers will inevitably add equipment and increase
schedules to accommodate them. Therefore, to ensure that discount
services would not become permanently embedded in the fare struc-
ture, the Board decided that all discount fares should be reviewed
every eighteen months and that the airlines would have to provide
clear evidence of profitability in order to continue them. The Board
specifically declined, however, to prohibit discount fares because this
"would largely remove from airline pricing the element of competi-
tion, and thus inhibit some of the dynamism and innovation which
37. This standard has been applied uniformly in Domestic Passenger-Fare Investi-
gation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, C.A.B. Order No. 72-12-18 (December 5, 1972); Standby
Youth Fares--"Young Adult" Fares, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L. REP. ( 21,886
(CAB 1969) (youth fares); Family Fare Tariffs, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Av.
L. REp. j 21,782 (CAB 1968) (family fares); Rates for Transportation by Air of Non-
priority Mail, 30 C.A.B. 951 (1960); Nonpriority Mail Rate Case, 34 C.A.B. 143 (1961);
Nonpriority Mail Rates, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L. REP. C 21,924 (CAB
1970) (nonpriority mail). The Board has said on at least one occasion that the profit-
impact test should not be applied to basic services (e.g., first-class coach, and economy).
U.S. Mainland-Hawaii Fares, 2 CCH Av. L. REP. 22,074 at 14,154 (CAB 1972). On the
other hand, it has accepted rates covering basic airline services (e.g., first-class fares,
short haul fares) which do not cover fully allocated cost. Passenger Fare Revisions-Do-
mestic Trunkline Carriers, C.A.B. Order No. 69-9-68 (Sept. 12, 1969) at 4, 7, 10, remanded,
Moss v. C.A.B., 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation Phase
4-Joint Fares, 2 CCH Av. L. REP. 22,062 (CAB 1972), modified, 22,071 at 14,099
(CAB 1972).
38. Standby Youth Fares--'Young Adult" Fares, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Av. L. REP. 21,886 at 14,814-15 (CAB 1969), reconsideration denied, 21,923 (C.AB 1970).
39. Order 70-1-147, 35 Fed. Reg. 2607 (1970).
40. Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, C.A.B. Order No.
72-12-18 (December 5, 1972).
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has been characteristic of the industry.' ' 41 Finally, the Board decided
to set full fares as if there were no discount fares in order to assure
that the latter would not burden the former. This policy also meant,
of course, that discount fares could not benefit the full fare passenger.
42
There is little doubt that the CAB has in fact adopted the rhetoric
of incremental cost analysis. It has said that incremental pricing bene-
fits all customers by lowering rates and improving service. A primary
reason for this view is that proper aerodynamics require passenger air-
craft to have a round cross-sectional design. This leaves a large amount
of "belly-cargo" space, suitable for passenger4' baggage, mail, express,
and freight. Each change in design, from propeller planes to jumbo
jets, has produced this excess capacity at least temporarily. The Board
clearly considers discount services desirable because they help fill
this spare capacity.43 The discount fares:
have provided an expanding traffic base to support a steadily in-
creasing total volume of service to the traveling public as a whole
to the benefit not merely of those traveling under promotional
[discount] fares, but to the benefit of the normal fare-paying pas-
sengers as well.
44
Referring to the freight services, the Board has said:
Where the demand for one of the jointly produced services [e.g.,
cargo service] is not sufficient to permit that service to recover
full costs from the rates charged, then clearly the users of all of
the services benefit from the establishment of rates at the level
which will produce the greatest total revenues, even though this
may mean that some services [e.g., passenger service] bear a higher
share of the joint costs than others. In that event, the revenues
realized by the byproduct service go to reduce the costs which
would otherwise have to be borne by the other services.
4
41. C.A.B. Order No. 72-12-18 at 53.
42. Unlike its earlier decisions, the Board's Phase 5 decision found that youth and
family fares did not meet the profit-impact test. "Discover America" fares were judged
to have passed the profit-impact test and were deemed reasonable. Youth standby fares
produced a marginal benefit under the profit-impact test but were judged discriminatory.
The Board used the profit-impact test to measure whether the discrimination inherent
in the discount fares was "unjust." All discount fares are prima facie discriminatory.
However, if they generate enough traffic and have a sufficiently favorable profit.impact
(e.g., Discover America fares), they are not unjustly discriminatory. On the other hand,
a marginal benefit is not sufficient to justify discrimination, e.g., youth standby fares.
Accordingly, the Board uses the profit-impact test as a standard to measure reasonable-
ness and unjust discrimination.
43. Standby Youth Fares-"Young Adult" Fares, [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Av. L. REP. 21,886 (CAB 1969), reconsideration denied, 21,923 (CAB 1970).
44. Id. at 14, 811.
45. Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 7-Fare Level, C.A.B. Order No.
71-4-59, 71-4-60 (April 9, 1971) at 44-45. "In such circumstances, it would clearly be in-
proper in fixing the rates for the other services to use fully allocated costing." Id.
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2. The Federal Power Commission
The FPC began its shift toward incremental costing at about the
same time as the CAB. Under the Natural Gas Act, the FPC is re-
quired to ensure that gas is sold "at the lowest possible reasonable
rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service."40 Thus its
objective is to achieve low rates, not protection for competitors. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission has held that coal interests, which are out-
side its jurisdiction and responsibility, are not entitled to protection
from pipeline companies, 47 and that comparisons of the relative costs
of coal and gas are irrelevant.
48
In 1962, in the Natural Gas Pipeline case,40 the Commission argued
that an increase in commodity rates toward full Atlantic Seaboard
formula costs would not be in the public interest because the higher
rates would cause Natural Gas to lose interruptible sales, forcing its
remaining customers to bear all of the fixed costs previously borne
by the interruptibles. 0 In 1967 in the second Atlantic Seaboard case,51
the Commission used the same rationale:
[C]ompetition from one of these sources [liquified petroleum gas]
could justify a lower commodity rate for gas sales than might
otherwise be appropriate.... [I]t is the injury to the other gas
customers of the pipelines which would result from a loss of sales
which will make a significant contribution to fixed charges rather
than the competitive position of the gas pipeline, as such, which
is determinative.
52
As the foregoing cases illustrate, the FPC has increasingly come to
rely on the economic analysis underlying incremental pricing. It has
46. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. F.P.C., 389 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1963). cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968). See also California Gas Producers Ass'n v. F.P.C., 421 F.2d
422, 428 (9th Cir. 1970); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. F.P.C., 404 F.2d 1268, 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. F.P.C., 374 F.2d 842, 852 (7th Cir. 1967);
Transwestern Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 659, 692 (1965) (Examiner's Opinion).
47. Mississippi River Transmission Corp., 41 F.P.C. 555, 558, 559, 567 (1969); At-
lantic Seaboard Corp., 37 F.P.C. 244, 248-49, 250-51 (1967); Midwestern Gas Transmission
Co., 34 F.P.C. 973, 983 (1965), afrd sub nom. Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. F.P.C.,
374 F.2d 842, 853 (7th Cir. 1967). See also United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1356-57
(1964) (intervention permitted on "relevant" issues only); Northern Natural Gas Co.,
28 F.P.C. 1155, 1162 (1962) (intervention by liquified petroleum gas interests), afd sub
nom. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. F.P.C., 330 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
48. American Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 30 F.P.C. 698, 703, 730 (1963), afrd sub nom.
Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. F.P.C., 338 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1964). The Commision
wants to keep pipeline "prices to a minimum so that the level of ultimate rates will be
competitively priced in an inter-fuel energy market." Columbia LNG Corp. et al., CCH
UT-L L. REP. 11,319 (FPC 1972) at 13,405, modified, 11,343 (FPC 1972).
49. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 28 F.P.C. 731 (1962).
50. 28 F.P.C. at 734.
51. Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 37 F.P.C. 244 (1967).
52. 37 F.P.C. at 249 n.5.
The Yale Law Journal
explicitly stated that rates which cover incremental costs and con-
tribute to fixed costs benefit not only the consumer of the service
whose rates are in question 53 but also customers who purchase the
company's other service; 54 they increase the load factor and reduce
unit costs,55 thereby reducing the share of fixed cost that must be
absorbed by other pipeline customers.56 Conversely, rates which cover
fully distributed costs as prescribed by the Atlantic Seaboard formula
may drive customers to other suppliers, thereby forcing the remain-
ing customers to pay higher rates.
57
More recently the apparent shortage of natural gas has led the FPC
to reexamine its use of incremental cost. In El Paso Natural Gas 8 the
Commission promised a "searching reappraisal" of its cost allocation
methodology in order to promote the conservation of gas for resi-
dential and other clean fuel uses and to discourage large volume in-
dustrial and boiler fuel use. While the Commission acknowledged that
it had "tilted" away from the Atlantic Seaboard formula to make gas
more competitive with other fuels, it resurrected the formula for pur-
poses of making allocations between El Paso's Southern Division (whose
rates were at issue) and its Northwestern Division, and between juris-
dictional and nonjurisdictional customers. Its decision had little direct
impact on El Paso's competitive rates.
The natural gas shortage should increase the commodity (volumetric)
cost of natural gas, and this should serve to induce industrial and boiler
fuel consumers to use other energy sources. An arbitrary allocation
of fixed cost to the commodity charge as called for by the Atlantic Sea.
board formula would, however, be totally unrelated to the degree of
scarcity of the gas.
Despite the questions raised by El Paso, the Commission returned
53. Northern Natural Gas Co., 15 F.P.C. 1634, 1636 (1956), rev'g 15 F.P.C. 673 (1956),
afj'd sub nom. National Coal Ass'n v. F.P.C., 247 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1957); American
Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 30 F.P.C. 698, 704 (1963), aff'd sub nor. Central Illinois Pub.
Serv. Co. v. F.P.C., 338 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1964).
54. Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. F.P.C., 374 F.2d 842, 852 (7th Cir. 1967); Trans-
western Pipeline Co., 36 F.P.C. 176 at 207, 214 (1966), aff'd sub noan. Southern California
Edison v. F.P.C., 387 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 909 (1968). Trans-
western Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 659, 678 (1965); Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 33 F.P.C. 545,
559 (1965); United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1347-49 (1964); Northern Natural Gas
Co., 15 F.P.C. 1634, 1636 (1956); American Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 30 F.I'.C. 698, 70-1.05,
726-27, 732-33 (1963).
55. Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. F.P.C., 374 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1967); Northern
Natural Gas Co., 15 F.P.C. 1634 (1956); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 659 at
678 (1965).
56. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 36 F.P.C. 176, 207 (1966); American Louisiana Pipe
Line Co., 30 F.P.C. 698, 704-05.
57. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 28 F.P.C. 731, 734 (1962).
58. El Paso Natural Gas Co., CCH UTIL. L. REP. 11,232 (FPC 1971), modified,
11,302 (FPC 1972).
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to incremental costing principles in the Columbia liquid natural gas
case.59 There the Commission required the pipelines to price im-
ported LNG on the basis of separate schedules that reflect the high
incremental cost of LNG. In its first decision it imposed conditions
which would also have required distributors to use incremental pric-
ing. In its second opinion it withdrew this requirement, leaving the
distributors and state commissions the option of averaging the high
cost of the imported gas with the lower cost of gas from old sources,
thereby enabling the sale of gas "at the lowest possible reasonable rate."
3. The Interstate Commerce Commission
The ICC is required by statute to consider the need for adequate
railway transportation "at the lowest cost consistent with the furnish-
ing of such service."60 Unlike the CAB or the FPC, however, the ICC
is subject to a unique statutory directive requiring it to protect competi-
tion among the different modes of transportation subject to its regu-
lation. 61 The ICC may maintain the rates of one carrier (typically the
railroads) to protect the traffic of another (typically the barges), if nec-
essary to protect an "inherent advantage" of the second carrier. 2
Although Ingot Molds seems to have identified the ICC as a com-
mission which uses a fully distributed cost criterion, the earlier New
Haven case appears to have had greater impact on the Commission's
current posture. For in New Haven, the Supreme Court did two
things. First, it struck down a Commission-prescribed differential: It
criticized the Commission's role as a "giant handicapper" and indi-
cated that the new legislation had ushered in a new era of "hard
competition." Second, the Court said that the water carriers had the
burden of proving any inherent cost advantage that they wished the
Commission to protect. Moreover, the Commission came to realize
the futility of attempting to control market divisions between the
water carriers and railroads where both faced substantial competition
from unregulated trucking: It could keep the railroads' rates up to
protect the water carriers but the effect might be that all traffic would
then flow to an unregulated mode.
Accordingly, the ICC has used an incremental cost standard to meas-
ure the reasonableness of rates where the regulated modes of trans-
59. Columbia LNG Corp. et al., CCH UnL. L. REP. E 11,319 (FPC 1972). modified,
11,343 (FPC 1972) at 13,402; 13,405; 13,533.
60. Interstate Commerce Act, § 15a(2), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15a(2) (1959).
61. Interstate Commerce Act, § 15a(3), 49 U..C.A. § 15a(S) (1959).
62. Id.
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portation face competition from unregulated suppliers.0 3 The Com-
mission has also found a variety of other reasons to allow rate reduc-
tions over the protests of competing carriers claiming inherent cost
advantage: that the reduction was not made to meet competition,0 4
or that it would not seriously injure the competitor; 5 that the rate
was above the fully distributed cost of the filing 0 or complaining
carrier,67 or that it would not require the low-cost carrier to price be-
low its fully distributed cost;08 or that cost evidence was inadequate.00
In fact, there have been only two cases since New Haven,70 and none
since Ingot Molds, which disallowed rate reductions to protect the in-
herent cost advantage of a competing carrier. Clearly, the Commis-
sion seems to have abdicated its role as a "giant handicapper."
The ICC has been less explicit than the CAB or the FPC on the
benefits of incremental pricing to consumers. Still, it has on occasion
used the incrementalist rhetoric that rate reductions which increase
revenues and improve efficiency are desirable. 71 While the ICC has
been short on rationale, however, it has rarely denied a rate reduc-
tion which meets the standards of incremental cost analysis.
12
63. Wooden Furniture, El Segundo, Cal., to Chicago, Ill., 332 I.C.C. 37 (Div. 2, 1967):
Wine, Pacific Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167 (1966); Grain in Multiple.Car Shipments-
River Crossings to the South, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965).
64. Wine, Pacific Coast to the East, 326 I.C.C. 119, 155 (Div. 2, 1965), ali'd, 329 I.C.C.
167 (1966) (rates would enable shippers to improve their competitive position in destina-
tion area).
65. Canned Goods, Between Pacific Coast and the East, 332 I.C.C. 55 (Div. 2, 1967);
Freight, All Kinds, L.C.L. Unitized Charges-U.S.A., 326 I.C.C. 594, 624-25 (Div. 2, Ex.
aminer's Report, 1965).
66. Wooden Furniture, El Segundo, Cal., to Chicago, Ill., 332 I.C.C. 37 (Div. 2, 1967);
Volume Class Rates, Transcontinental Territory, 325 I.C.C. 735, 740 (1965); Candy and
Confectionery from N.J., N.Y. and Pa. to Tex., 321 I.C.C. 154 (1963); Electric Cable and
Wire from Worcester, Mass., to Houston, Tex., 319 I.C.C. 390 (Div. 2, 1963).
67. Corn and Corn Products, Illinois to Official Territory, 332 I.C.C. 485 (1968). Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. New York Central R.R., 329 I.C.C. 589 (Div. 2, 1967); Grain from
Idaho, Oregon and Washington to Ports in Oregon and Washington, 326 I.C.C. 358 (1966).
68. Newsprint Paper from Tenn. and Ala. to Houston, Tex., 313 I.C.C. 669 (1961).
69. Since New Haven the Commission has often allowed out-of-pocket pricing be-
cause the complaining party did not carry its burden of proving inherent cost advan.
tage or the Commission was dissatisfied with the cost evidence. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Morris, 340 I.C.C. 51, 60 (1971); Corn and Soybeans Midwest to Gulf Ports, for Export,
339 I.C.C. 595, 616 (1971); Portland Freight Traffic Ass'n v. Northern Pacific Ry., 337
I.C.C. 826 (Div. 2, 1970) (variable costs); Chemicals in Aggregate Shipments-Midland,
Mich. to East, 335 LC.C. 20, 35 (1969); Canned Goods, Between Pacific Coast and the
East, 332 I.C.C. 55, 68 (Div. 2, 1967); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. New York Central R.R.,
329 I.C.C. 589, 592 (Div. 2. 1967); Canned or Preserved Foodstuffs, Fla. to N.Y. and N.J.,
326 I.C.C. 776, 781 (Div. 2, 1966).
70. The two cases we found were Volume Class Rates, Transcontinental Territory,
325 I.C.C. 735 (App. Div. 2, 1965); Pig Iron from Buffalo, N.Y. to Chicago, Ill., and Gary,
Ind., 321 I.C.C. 121 (Div. 2, 1963).
71. Canned or Preserved Foodstuffs, Fla. to N.Y. and N.J., 326 I.C.C. 776, 784 (Div. 2,
1966); Wine, Pacific Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167, 169 (1966).
72. The ICC has no rule imposing an FDC "floor for transportation prices." Ingot
Molds case, 326 I.C.C. at 82; Wine, Pacific Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167, 171 (196).
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Conclusion
The three federal regulatory commissions have now taken rather
definitive positions consistent with the incremental cost approach. They
appear to have accepted the view that incremental pricing criteria can
benefit consumers, both those who buy the service whose price is in
question and those who buy other services supplied by the same firm.
The fact that the competitors are the most frequent proponents of a
fully distributed cost criterion is hardly astonishing. Nor is it re-
markable that adherence to fully distributed cost standards is weaker
in agencies whose primary obligation under the enabling legislation
is to protect the interests of consumers. Finally, it was to be expected
that few consumer representatives have advocated the use of fully
distributed cost before the commissions: After all, cost standards that
make for high prices are unlikely to commend themselves to pur-
chasers, even if such standards are allegedly instituted for their own
good.
What is surprising is the extent to which fully distributed cost
seems to have been abandoned in the regulation of rates in the presence
of competition. Nevertheless, proponents of fully distributed cost per-
sist and are currently presenting their arguments to all three commis-
sions in pending proceedings. The debate over the appropriate cost
standard for future governmental regulation thus seems far from over.
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